On Additional Sentencing and Deportation


This continues our series of student reflections and analysis authored by our research team.

 The Prosecution Project (tPP) analyzes a wide variety of variables to uncover and assess patterns in the prosecution and punishment of domestic terrorism in the United States, and my research has led me to pay interest to one variable in particular: additional sentencing.

In our codebook, additional sentencing is an open-ended, quasi-catch-all variable. tPP explicitly measures the length of jail/prison sentences and the presence or absence of life/death sentences. The additional sentencing variable, however, records other punishments, as well as any special enhancements specified in their sentencing or notable acts the defendant was charged under. Common codes under the additional sentencing variable include probation, time served, and hate crime or firearm enhancements. This variable holds a treasure trove of information for future analysis, but one specific code under this umbrella caught my interest from the beginning of my time working with tPP: deportation.

After joining tPP this past winter and beginning to code cases, I began to notice the repetition of deportation as an added punishment on top of, or in lieu of, the standard jail sentencing or probation. According to USA.gov, the United States “may deport foreign nationals who participate in criminal acts, are a threat to public safety, or violate their visa” (USA.gov). This broad operationalization of the criterion allowing for deportation gives the United States government the power to deport most of the foreign-born nationals in our data set. The only factor that should determine whether deportation occurs is whether the foreign defendant in question is found guilty or innocent of a criminal act, but the United States does not seem to apply this policy consistently.

As of October 2018, tPP has a completed data set of nearly 1200 cases, 32 of which involve deportation. However, of the cases in our data set, 296 involve foreign-born, non-naturalized defendants. Many foreign born, non-naturalized individuals were found guilty, but were still allowed to remain in the country. After spending nearly a year working with this project, my question is: why? Are there consistent, measurable differences in the characteristics of foreign-born, deported defendants compared to the characteristics of foreign-born, non-deported defendants? How does this compare to our tPP data set as whole? My future research using the data tPP has gathered will aim to uncover if there is a clear answer to these questions.

– Zoe


USA.gov. (2018). Deportation. Retrieved from https://www.usa.gov/deportation

Exploring pleas

This continues our series of student reflections and analysis authored by our research team.

At the start of my work in the Prosecution Project (tPP), I had little knowledge about most things involving court cases and sentencing. Many questions have occurred to me throughout my research, but a recurring one involves pleas.

What is a plea, why do people plead the way that they do, and how does that affect their sentencing? I was curious to know how they decided to plea – and whether their plea was truthful to the fact that they’ve committed the crime or not – as well as what their choice in plea decided for them in terms of sentencing.

So, why do defendants plead guilty? If a defendant pleads guilty, it can save them from sitting in a jail cell for many months or even years awaiting a trial to be scheduled and conducted. According to Above the Law, “…people who go to trial and are convicted get much heavier sentences than those who plea-bargain.” (2018) Another reason people accept plea bargains is that they’re offered lesser sentencing (such as probation) as a plea bargain. If they don’t take the offer, usually quickly, they stand the chance of being sentenced much heavier in trial.

Finally, people may choose to take a plea bargain because of their financial situation. According to HG Legal Resources, “lawyers will put in a significantly lower number of hours to effectuate a plea bargain than going to trial.” This would save the defendant a substantial amount of money as well as time, essentially making a plea bargain more attractive than spending the effort going to trial.

So, how does our data compare to national standards? In our clean (i.e. completed and verified) dataset of 1075 cases, 611 of those (56.8%) have pled guilty, 284 (26.4%) have pled not guilty, and the other 16.8% have pled one of the following: guilty but mentally ill, guilty on some counts but not on others, insanity, justifiable homicide, non-cooperating plea agreement, or they have been charged but not tried, their cases are still pending, or the plea is unknown.

According to the New York Times, “…97 percent of federal cases and 94 percent of state cases end in plea bargains, with defendants pleading guilty in exchange for a lesser sentence” (2012). Statistically, these percentages for all national and statewide defendants that have pled guilty are much higher than the 56.8% of our collected terrorism cases. Our data is atypical in this sense, with more defendants pleading not guilty or one of the aforementioned pleas than the national or state average.

Why may that be? Are people who are charged with terrorism-related charges more willing to plead not guilty because they know it is likely that they will be harshly sentenced either way, no matter what they plead? That speaks to a larger issue of its own, concerning how we (or the law) define terrorism and the sentences that come with it.

-Isabella Jackson


Goode, E. (2012, March 22). Stronger Hand for Judges After Rulings on Plea Deals. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-after-rulings-on-plea-deals.hty bml

HG Legal. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/should-i-just-plead-guilty-and-avoid-a-trial-33486

Messina, T. (2018, July 23). Innocent People Who Plead Guilty. Retrieved from https://abovethelaw.com/2018/07/innocent-people-who-plead-guilty/

How the court responds to your plea

This continues our series of student reflections and analysis authored by our research team.

It is a long process. Researching, analyzing, recording, and transferring the information gathered into the spreadsheet for each case takes time, and is especially draining when you lack a thorough understanding of how court cases function or law-related terminology. Given this is my first semester researching for the Prosecution Project, I had to spend time learning the definitions of many words and phrases. One thing that confused me for a while were the different types of court decisions and plea options for defendants. As a result, I want others to have a better understanding of the pleas and court decisions we consider, because most of this information is vital to understanding any local or national court case along with understanding the Prosecution Project’s methods.

In the courtroom, there exist three pleas: guilty, meaning you admit to your offense; not guilty, meaning you disagree with your charges and wish to challenge them in court; and no contest, meaning you neither agree nor disagree with the charges and simply wish to close the case (Criminal Law 101 FAQ). In our dataset, however, we consider eleven different types of pleas to get a better understanding of the defendant’s head state, which include: guilty, guilty on some counts and not guilty on others, guilty but mentally ill, non-cooperating plea agreement, insanity, justifiable defense/homicide, divine obligation, charged but not tried, pending, not Guilty, and unknown. In our dataset, we also consider nine different court decisions, including: guilty, plea bargain (guilty), guilty on some charges, non-cooperating plea agreement, incompetent to stand trial, hung jury/mistrial, charged but not tried, pending, and not guilty.

By considering each plea and court decision one at a time, we can develop a better understanding of how the tPP analyzes cases. So, what does it mean to plead guilty? This means the defendant is confronted with a case and wishes to resolve it quickly. Defendants will usually plead guilty for three reasons: sentencing, money, and the uncertainty of trial.  If a defendant chooses to plead guilty after reaching a bargain with a prosecutor, he may get his time in jail reduced. Defendants will also plead guilty if they do not have the money or time to wait for a trial and pay for a good lawyer. Finally, defendants will also plead guilty to avoid the uncertainty of a trial. By going through a trial, more evidence against the defendant has the potential to surface, along with unwanted amounts of media attention (Pleading Guilty or Going to Trial: Pros and Cons). One trend seen in our dataset is the guilty plea of minorities and lower-class citizens, because these groups are less likely to afford big-shot lawyers. Often, as well, criminals who committed bigger crimes will plead guilty to lesser offenses to reduce the potential for larger sentences.

This leads into our dataset’s second plea option, which is pleading guilty on some accounts and not others. An example of this is when a defendant is being charged with “assault with a weapon” for throwing a phone at someone. The defendant would choose to plead guilty to assault instead, because that is a subset of the charge (Guilty Pleas | LawFacts). Roughly 95% of criminal court cases end with some sort of plea bargain, making guilty pleas the most popular in our dataset (Denver). If a defendant chooses to enter a plea bargain but only speaks to their own involvement in case and will not give information out about other criminals or co-defendants, we code the plea as a noncooperating plea agreement. Anarchist groups are likely to do this because pleading for other defendants gives the government a sort of upper-hand, which goes against their philosophy of self-governance.

If a defendant is found guilty for an offense but committed to a mental hospital instead of prison, we would enter their plea as guilty but mentally ill. These defendants are deemed to lack the mental capabilities to withstand prison. To plea insanity is a plea of guilt, but with reasoning pertaining to why the defendant committed the crime (Guilty but Mentally Ill Law and Legal Definition | USLegal, Inc.). Defendants will plea insanity when they want to pursue the idea that they were too sick to understand the legal consequences or the impact of their actions.

Aside from pleading insanity, we code for other pleas that include a defendant’s justification for his actions. When a defendant pleads a justifiable offense/homicide, the defendant is using the self-defense argument, meaning his actions were called for given the circumstance. We say a defendant pleads divine obligation when he was compelled to commit a crime because some deity or god commanded him to carry through. We see this plea most commonly with radical religious groups.

Defendants will plead not guilty in the pursuit of justice. As opposed to pleading guilty to avoid the financial struggle and timeline of a trial, the defendant will go to trial if they believe there is not enough evidence to convict him or that he was wrongly convicted. If, however, the defendant pleads not guilty and is found guilty by the court, the consequences are more dire.

The rest of the pleas code for are less complex. Pending will be used for more recent cases in which a defendant has been charged and we are waiting to hear their response. Charged but not tried usually occurs when something happens that inhibits the hearing to proceed, such as the defendant running away to another country or the defendant dying. Last, we use unknown when we cannot find any of the other pleas.

We clarify a court decision as guilty for defendants that plead guilty, plea bargain, and guilty on some charges but not others. This results in the defendant serving out some sentence, and includes but is not limited to an X number of years, life, death, or additional sentencing such as supervised release or deportation.

If the court determines someone as incompetent to stand trial, that means that the defendant is unable to keep up with or fully understand his trial due to some sort of mental or developmental disability (What Happens if I am Found Incompetent to Stand Trial?). This will usually result in holding off the trial until a psychologist or medical examiner is able to deem the defendant competent or bring the defendant up to competency. When competence is reestablished, the trial will proceed.

If we code a court decision as a hung jury/mistrial, we consider multiple reasons as to why a decision could not be reached. A hung jury is when the jury cannot reach a verdict and is unable to reach unanimity or supermajority regarding the defendant’s guilt or innocence. A mistrial, like a hung jury, can happen when there is lack of jurisdiction, problems with the jury, death or illness of necessary attorneys, or obvious prejudices (Mistrial).

When the court decision is declared as not guilty, that means the prosecutor had not proved the defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Last, like the pleas, the rest of the court decisions are less complex.  We make a court decision pending for more recent cases where a verdict has not been reached. We say charged but not tried when the defendant is not present to be tried.

Now that there is a more thorough understanding of how the Prosecution Project analyzes a defendant’s plea and a court’s decision, outside viewers can acknowledge the depth we take when looking into cases. By considering each of these types of pleas and court decisions, we as the tPP can uncover facts about a case that may get overpassed.

– Angela


“Criminal Law 101 FAQ: Types of Criminal Pleas.” Fighter Law, www.fighterlaw.com/criminal-law-101/criminal-trial-lawyer/types-of-criminal-pleas/.

“Pleading Guilty or Going to Trial: Pros and Cons.” Hg.org, www.hg.org/legal-articles/pleading-guilty-or-going-to-trial-pros-and-cons-36359.

Guilty Pleas | LawFacts, lawfacts.ca/criminal/guiltypleas.

Dever, Lindsey. Plea and Charge Bargaining. Bureau of Justice Assistance U.S. Department of Justice, 24 Jan. 2011.

“Guilty but Mentally Ill Law and Legal Definition.” Guilty but Mentally Ill Law and Legal Definition | USLegal, Inc., US Legal, Inc, definitions.uslegal.com/g/guilty-but-mentally-ill/.

“What Happens If I Am Found Incompetent to Stand Trial?” Blanchard Law, 8 Aug. 2018, blanchard.law/incompetent-stand-trial/.

“Mistrial.” The Free Dictionary, Farlex, legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/mistrial.

On lone wolves and leaderless resistance

This continues our series of student reflections and analysis authored by our research team.

In the last couple of weeks, I have focused more heavily on coding and verifying cases taking place between 2012 and today. A growing trend I have noticed is the rise in number of leaderless attacks. According to “Lone Wolf Report,” a 2015 study published by the Southern Poverty Law Center, 74% of domestic terrorist attacks between the years 2009 and 2015 have been ones carried out by a single person acting alone. The report allows readers to visualize how difficult stopping these acts of terrorism has become.

Today, “lone wolves” or “leaderless resistance” do not tend to speak of their plans with anyone. Even if operating in small groups, the characteristics of these perpetrators are written by Lewis W. Dickson’s 2015 case study “Lone Wolf Terrorism” as isolated, impulsive, and pushed to violence without any assistance (Dickson 2015, p. 8). Further, while the planning of a terrorist attack by an extremist organization can be infiltrated, the planning conducted by lone wolves today can go completely undetected especially because of the growing predominance of the Internet (Dickson 2015, p. 9).

In the 2015 February summit, former President Barack Obama addressed the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, France and the growing fear around jihadist threats. While the summit remained in the scope of all acts of terrorism, it is difficult to shake acts committed in furtherance of al Qaeda, especially if their highly covered by the media. What I have found through tPP are how much more complex the non-religious attacks are. In most cases, the assailant is taken down by police, and if not cooperating, killed at the scene to protect those around him. The tPP is focused on the prosecution of domestic terrorist acts, so individuals such as Larry Steve McQuilliams, a claimed disciple shot down to protect those he believed were slandering the name of God, are not included in the dataset.

An example of this difficult issue is the case of Brent Douglas Cole. He was a claimed sovereign citizen who was charged with the assault of police officers who questioned him on his illegally parked motorcycle. We found him to have no apparent socio-political motive because the attack was out of anger, not to further his sovereign citizen idealism. Because he had no prior agenda to inflict harm and survived his take down, the reasoning behind his attack on authority has been determined as someone who was mentally unstable.

The theories behind all these motivations are interesting ones. In my previous blog post I wrote of the stereotypes of mental health and these crimes. McQuilliams believed he was doing good, and if alive, could have been diagnosed to better understand his decision of action. The reason why lone wolf perpetrators are so tricky is because of how undetectable they are, the intentions they may not be able to announce, and their belief system. While Cole was reckless and impulsive, his temper and irrationality got the best of him. This unknown of how to handle either of these cases could simply be because of the stigmas surrounding mental health clouding the ability to treat those who present signs of an illness. If properly educated, a path to decreasing the growing amount of lone wolf attacks could potentially be uncovered.

 – Brenda


Dickson, Lewis W. (2015). Lone Wolf Terrorism. A Case Study: The Radicalization

Process of a Continually Investigated & Islamic State Inspired Lone Wolf Terrorist. Malmo University, 1-40. Retrieved from https://muep.mau.se/bitstream/handle/2043/19258/Lone%20Wolf%20Terrorism%20-%20Masters%20Thesis%20-%20Lewis%20W.Dickson.pdf?sequence=2

Southern Poverty Law Center. (February 11, 2015). Lone Wolf Report. Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved from https://www.splcenter.org/20150211/lone-wolf-report

The Evolution of tPP

This continues our series of student reflections and analysis authored by our research team.

In the April of 2017, a group of approximately twenty undergraduates from various backgrounds slowly trickled in to an empty classroom at Miami University in the late afternoon.  That afternoon was the first meeting of the Prosecution Project.  Of those twenty-some undergraduate students, four remain with the Project now, in the fall of 2018. Since then, nearly 45 Miami University students have contributed in some way to the project, whether it be for a few weeks, a semester, or a year.

As the Prosecution Project approaches its second year, the outcome is slightly different than what was imagined at the start — I can say this with certainty, since I was in the room for that very first meeting nearly two years ago.  The Prosecution Project was initially conceived as a one-year ordeal, wherein the upcoming summer and throughout the fall semester, researchers would gather and code data, and in the spring semester, analyze and report on that data, with the outcome of a publication in a year’s time. We soon realized that this project was going to become much larger than that. More and more cases continued to be input, more detailed and intricate coding questions began to come up, and the scope of the project expanded exponentially.

Data collecting and coding continued well into the spring of 2018, with monumental questions of methodology, coding, theoretical framework, and other fundamental aspects of the Project being brought up at each weekly team meeting. It became clear quite clear that there would be no publishable output by the end of the academic year, but we did begin to expand the “deliverables” of the Project into mediums not yet considered. The blog was created in the spring, as a way to show people outside of our small team and its supporters what we had been doing for the past year. Preliminary analysis began on the data, even if it was nothing more than a framework for future analysis. We began to systematize the process of coding, including drop down menus in our dataset for faster and more uniform variable level assignment; creating teams of coders that work in tandem to independently code and verify doubly that cases were coded correctly; the organization of different files that accompany the Project, including source files for each case; and a number of people assigned to scrape new cases and cases we may have previously missed from large databases and other sources. The new plan was to have a complete dataset by the end of the summer of 2018.

When the fall rolled around, we soon realized that this plan just wasn’t feasible. We were adding hundreds of new cases each week, and of the then-nearly-2000 cases we had added, only about 800 had been coded and verified. Our new plan became intensive coding weeks in which we could complete as many cases as possible, followed by a semester of analysis and producing reports.

Now, in October of 2018, the goal has shifted again, and is, in truth, still evolving. The current plan which that we are working with right now is a multi-layered analysis. As of mid-October, we have over 2000 cases added, and of those cases, over 1000 complete and verified. Part of the team is currently working on continuing to code, while other subgroups of our 20 undergraduate researchers are doing analysis in multiple forms. We have a team of researchers running descriptive statistics and generating data visualizations, a team working on inferential statistics to generate correlations and regressions and other statistical results, and a team working on the beginning stages of Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

While the Prosecution Project has evolved significantly over the past 18 months and become a much bigger feat than we could’ve imagined that April afternoon in that first little meeting, it has not lost sight of its goal. We hope to not only begin publications and mini-reports of our own findings of the prosecutions of acts of political violence/extremism and terrorism, but also to make our database accessible to students as a tool for conducting research, and to the public in the pursuit of open and accessible knowledge.


Athena Chapekis is a senior sociology major at Miami University and senior team member and data analyst at the Prosecution Project

Evaluating “Success” in Terrorism and Counterterrorism

This continues our series of student reflections and analysis authored by our research team.

Some of the great opportunities that the Prosecution Project (tPP) provided me include being able to find an interesting niche within the field of terrorism studies, employ the tools within the project to enhance my understanding of certain topics, and try to tackle challenging analytical problems through critical thinking. How the state responds to terrorism is a leading subject within the field, and as my interest in the topic developed, I’ve found that one puzzling issue is central to understanding counterterrorism initiatives: how do we best evaluate the success of terrorist organizations? As the war on terror persists through the century, it can be helpful for academics, policymakers, officials, and citizens alike to produce a more grounded dialectic by reflecting on the successes and failures of groups past and present. But measuring success requires us to appropriately define it and quantify it, and my contribution will utilize tPP to hopefully help frame and measure organizational success over time.

A good first decision that must be made when answering the question involves choosing a perspective from amongst the various actors. Do we define success according to the perspective of the terrorist group? The government? The individual suspect(s)? Each actor will judge a certain operation differently from the other. Fortunately, the cases in tPP can represent all of these perspectives, but to varying degrees. Since the goal of the project is to understand how the United States prosecutes individuals with crimes related to political violence, the government’s perspective will be front and center, and it will be the primary lens which I will employ. From the state’s view — and often from each actor’s view — success is multifaceted; that is, there is no single method to calculate success, but it involves a combination of equally important values. Here, Daniel Byman’s five measures of success (two of which are listed) provide a mostly functional, if imprecise, foundation for understanding the state’s perspective:

Freedom of operation. The first method looks at how secure a group may be in a certain location. According to the state, part of a group’s success means having “secure areas in which they can organize and plan with little fear…[and] can wait to strike at their pleasure” (Byman 2003). Certainly, an organization’s network will never be completely removed, but single operations can be shut down. The better an organization is able to operate out of an area, the more successful it is at perpetuating terrorist activity. At least some of this freedom can be operationalized through the city, state, and country variables in the tPP dataset. We unfortunately cannot discriminate between cases where a group claims responsibility for certain crimes versus isolated “lone wolf” crimes, which would erase issues of counting individuals with no attachment whatsoever to a group as being apart of an organization’s “footprint”. Even so, by focusing on one group’s activities in specific cities over time, we may gain insight into how well the government can curtail their operations.

Success in recruitment. The second method understands a group’s success in terms of the size of their recruitment base. Byman points to leadership structures (either centralized or decentralized) as being key to this method of approximation. Some groups, he states, rapidly decline as soon as their top leaders are killed or captured — like the Kurdish Workers Party in Turkey or Sendero Luminoso in Peru — while other groups can remain virulent and active despite losing many leaders, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. Decentralized leadership means that “for a group like Al-Qaeda, disrupting recruitment is a vital…measure of success” (Byman 2003).

This variable is notoriously tricky to account for, though, since we can only rely on estimates that can enumerate the size of recruits. To some extent, the tPP dataset can approximate this amount of involvement, although with a great deal of imprecision. Many organizations with fewer members and/or more centralized leadership may engage in plots alongside their operators, and will thus be deemed as co-defendants. If we pair this with the hypothesis that most recruits are not repeat offenders, this could be tied to our “Previous Similar Crime” variable that tracks individuals with multiple convictions. Accumulating both results could help us determine if organizations utilize recruits or existing members for their operations, with the sense that the more recruits they gain, the more momentum and “success” they may have.

These are just a couple of the ways in which the tPP dataset will reflect measurements for success. To be sure, there are clear disadvantages for adopting certain methods, but I believe that by wrestling with these imprecisions and finding better ways to make more accurate inferences, the data will better our understanding.

– Michael Thompson


Byman, Daniel. “Scoring the War on Terrorism.” The National Interest, no. 72 (2003): 75-84. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42897485.

On the Coding of Foreign Affiliation

This continues our series of student reflections and analysis authored by our research team.

While the Prosecution Project (tPP) codes cases of domestic political violence for forty different variables, one that deserves specific attention is that of “foreign affiliation.” This variable can be best defined as a defendant’s affiliation with a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). FTO’s are defined as “a non-US organization that engages in terrorist activity that threatens US nationals or national security.” A list of FTOs, as catalogued by the US Department of State, can be found here.

The only options when coding for this variable are “no,” “yes,” or “unknown.” During the process of researching any given case, foreign affiliation is apparent almost immediately. Because involvement with an FTO connotes an individual’s terroristic threat, documentation of affiliation is both critical and consistent throughout legal proceedings. If there is any mention of, or allusion towards, any group on the state department’s list of FTOs, the case receives a code of “yes” for foreign affiliation. If there is no mention of any FTO, the code for the case is “no.”

Within our dataset, there are only a handful of cases which have been coded as “unknown” regarding foreign affiliation. The circumstances leading to the ambiguity of foreign affiliation in these cases can best be explained by confusion surrounding the events of the crime itself. A great example of this phenomenon can be found in the 2016 case of Michelle Marie Bastian. Bastian sent ISIS propaganda to her incarcerated husband, but this exchange of terroristic material does not insinuate collusion with an FTO itself. In this case, there was likely no direct contact between the defendant and the FTO; however, because there is a lack of evidence that clearly states Bastian obtained the propaganda from an indirect rather than direct source, the foreign affiliation category must be coded as “unknown” rather than “no.”

Following the coding for the variable of foreign affiliation, members of tPP code for group affiliation. It is important to recognize that a “no” for foreign affiliation does not mean that there is no group affiliation. While this may seem to be an obvious statement, our “group affiliation” variable is inclusive of domestic, as well as foreign, terrorist organizations.

As we continue with individual analyses of tPP’s dataset, I plan to examine the implications of foreign affiliation and its interaction with other variables. One relationship worth analyzing is that of foreign affiliation and citizenship. An interesting correlation may be made when pooling cases where the defendant has a foreign affiliation and comparing, within those cases, whether the individual is an American citizen or not. Furthermore, disparities in sentencing within the case pool of foreign affiliation may be juxtaposed relative to the aforementioned variable of citizenship.

Foreign affiliation, upon initial inspection, does not appear to be an overly significant variable relative to the others within our dataset; however, it’s presence, or lack there of, poses considerable influence over the interpretation of the prosecution of political violence cases in general. The relationships between foreign affiliation and other variables (particularly citizenship, tactic, and sentencing) likely possess valuable information regarding the factors governing an individual’s decision to participate in political violence, and how they choose to do so.

Affiliation with an FTO likely determines, or partially shapes the tactic and tactic variable which a defendant utilizes in offending. These relationships also likely reveal connections between the resulting convictions and sentencing of defendants and foreign affiliation, with notable regard to the proceedings of the US’s judicial system. Ultimately, tPP’s coding of foreign affiliation deserves to be analyzed in greater depth. When we consider the impact of FTOs on individual perpetrators, we reveal the severity of their danger to national security.

I look forward to studying foreign affiliation as tPP moves forward into statistical and analytical research and presentation of our finalized dataset for the semester!


Izzy Bielamowicz is a Junior pursuing a degree in Political Science with a double minor in Criminology and Philosophy and Law. Izzy has been with tPP since August 2018.

Want to join tPP for the Spring semester?

Now entering its 5th semester, the Prosecution Project (tPP) is currently recruiting a limited number of student researchers and analysts for the Spring semester.

tPP is a large data collection and analysis project that seeks to understand trends in how political violence, terrorism, and extremism are prosecuted in the US court system. The project involves a combination of locating cases, coding them together with team members and helping to generate and interpret quantitative and qualitative forms of analysis. Interested students can enroll as coders (via an independent study) or as analysts/writers (via SOC462).

There are two ways for Miami students to join tPP:

1.) We are interested in recruiting approximately 10 new student coders to help locate and code cases for the data set. This involves pairing up with another student coder, locating records and court documents, discussing the case, and finally entering information into an already established database. Student coders must register for 1-3 credits of independent study with Professor Loadenthal (credits will be in Sociology/SOC or Social Justice Studies/SJS). If you would like to join as a team coder, please complete the application here and our team will be in touch. Space is limited so please apply as soon as you’re able.

2.) We are also seeking up to 15 new students to join as analysts focused of the current data set to generate research suitable for publication. Students may enroll in SOC462 which will be an applied sociological research class, focused on terrorism studies, and based entirely around the tPP data set. To join this class, complete the application and email Professor Loadenthal to be added. Our goal is to publish a collection of scholarly research dealing with the tPP dataset in 2019, and the project director has already spoken with several journals about this.

No previous experience is required for coders or analysts, and the opportunity is open to students of all majors. Students student coders will be required to check in with the team twice a month and student analysts–those enrolled in SOC462–must attend that class and complete writing assignments. We are specially seeking Freshman, Sophomore and Junior students who can engage with the project for multiple terms and most team members have enjoyed their work and have sustained it throughout their their at Miami.

We are also interested in finding a few students with specialized skill sets including machine learning/artificial intelligence, grant writing, Digital content management systems and marketing/outreach. Students interested in working in these areas should complete the online applicationTo see our growing team of student researchers, visit us here!

Why join tPP?

  • Get real world experience dealing with court records, criminal indictments and data processing relevant for careers in law, public policy, intelligence analysis, security/law enforcement and government.
  • Learn and practice research skills including project design, data coding, qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, data verification, sampling and using software suites such as SPSS, R, Tableau and a variety of cloud computing platforms.
  • Have the opportunity to publish in high ranking academic journals, present at conferences, and generate connections which are helpful for graduate school and other post-college challenges.
  • Meet with professionals working on issues of security, crime, terrorism and extremism including local leaders in the FBI, US Attorneys Office and Cincinnati Fusion Center, and leading academics at Georgetown University, George Mason University, University of Cincinnati, University of Maryland and elsewhere.
  • Help to create the largest, ideologically-mixed data set for public use by researchers, academics and other practitioners.

Upcoming tPP Publication

This continues our series of student reflections and analysis authored by our research team.

In the 2019 “Emergent Voices” edition of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism, myself and Athena Chapekis (two student researchers for tPP) will have our work featured using the Prosecution Project (tPP) database. Our article, entitled “The prosecution of others: Presidential rhetoric and the interrelation of framing, legal prosecutions, and the Global War on Terror”, investigates the link between presidential rhetoric and the framing of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in connection to the prosecution of “othered” and “non-othered” individuals.

“Othered”, in this context, refers specifically to individuals who are or appear to be Muslim, Arab/Middle Eastern, and/or foreign-born. We hypothesized the United States government will prosecute, charge, and sentence “othered” individuals more harshly than “non-othered” individuals and that this discrepancy in prosecution would be directly impacted by the framing of the GWOT by the United States’ presidential administrations.

In order to test this claim, we first created time blocks based on significant periods in the presidential administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama following 9/11. The first time block constituted immediate events in the five months following the 9/11 attacks (9/11/2001 – 02/08/2002). The events included the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists” (AUMF) joint resolution (Congress 2001); the passage of the PATRIOT Act (Department of Justice 2001); and the authorization of military force in Afghanistan (Congress 2001). Notably, this block also saw the creation of the phrase “GWOT” as well as an increase in “othering” verbal rhetoric by George W. Bush (Hodges 2011). The second time block documented the remainder of the Bush administration (02/08/2002 – 01/20/2009). Events included the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 (“The Iraq War” n.d.) and the economic sanctions against Syria (BBC News 2018). Most of the presidential rhetoric in this time block was based less on verbal statements of “othering” and more on military action within the Middle East. The third time block examined the Obama administration (01/20/2009 – 12/31/2016). This time block included events such as the withdrawal of troops from Iraq in 2009 (Jaffe 2016); military initiatives in Syria (Obama 2013); and the establishment of the Islamic State’s Caliphate (Wilson Center 2016; BBC News 2018). Notably, Obama explicitly refrained from the use of “othering” language, but utilized military action in the Middle East. The actions of the presidential administrations served to strengthen the association of terrorism as a phenomenon inherent to Muslim, Arab/Middle Eastern, and/or foreign-born individuals through verbal statements, military action, and/or divisive administrative policies.

In order to test how these shifts in presidential rhetoric affected the prosecution and sentencing of “othered” versus “non-othered” individuals, we utilized the tPP dataset. We consolidated the codes of “Religion: Muslim”, “Ethnicity: Arab/Persian/Kurdish/Bedouin”, and “Citizenship: Non-United States Citizen” (specifically from a Middle Eastern country) to create a new code “ ‘Othered’ status”. If an individual fell into one or more of the above categories, then they were coded as “othered”. Using the date range described in the time blocks, we created a sub-dataset from 09/11/2001 to 12/31/2016 that included 520 double verified cases. We compared differences in “othered” and “non-othered” prosecutions in the three time blocks across the following variables of interest: length of sentencing, life sentence status, and number of people killed and injured by the crime.

Our original prediction that “othered” individuals would receive longer jail sentences than “non-othered” individuals was not supported by our findings. This can still be attributed, however, to the “othering” rhetoric of the Bush administration immediately post-9/11. According to the tPP dataset, the majority of these prosecutions were non-violent crimes, mostly immigration violations that resulted in deportation. These prosecutions corresponded to “terror sweeps” that occurred post-9/11, in which Arab/Middle Eastern and/or Muslim individuals in the United States were targeted by the government as “possible accomplices” to the 9/11 attacks (Akram and Karmely 2004). Almost all of the over 1,200 individuals taken into custody were found to have no ties to foreign terrorist organizations, and were either released free of charge or charged with felony immigration violations.

Interestingly, we did find that the prosecution of “othered” individuals significantly differed from “non-othered” individuals immediately after 9/11 and during the Obama years.

While we previously discussed how Bush’s rhetoric led to the “terror sweeps” post-9/11, there is less evidence to suggest a direct relationship between the maintenance of “othering” rhetoric in the latter Bush years and an increase in “othered” prosecution rates, as “othered” and “non-othered” individuals were prosecuted at similar rates. Moreover, Obama’s lack of othering rhetoric in speech did not correspond to a reduction of “othered” prosecutions; in fact, “othered” prosecutions not only increased, but increased differentially as compared to “non-othered” individuals. Further research may be needed to investigate the effects of direct speech as rhetoric versus indirect action as rhetoric in the legal prosecution of “othered” individuals.


Sarah Moore is a senior team member of the Prosecution Project and a former intern at Only Through US.


Akram, Susan M., and Karmely, Maritza. 2004. “Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction without a Difference?” U.C. Davis Law Review 38, no. 3: 609-700

BBC News. 2018. “Syria Profile,” April 24, 2018, sec. Middle East. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995.

Congress. 2001. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists. https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf.

Department of Justice. 2001. “The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty,” October, 4. https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/what_is_the_patriot_act.pdf

Hodges, Adam. 2011. The “War on Terror” Narrative: Discourse and Intertextuality in the Construction and Contestation of Sociopolitical Reality. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.

Jaffe, Greg. n.d. “‘Tell Me How This Ends’: Obama’s Struggle with the Hard Questions of War.” Washington Post. Accessed April 24, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/obama-legacy/ending-war-in-iraq.html.

“The Iraq War.” n.d. Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed April 29, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war.

“Timeline: The Rise, Spread and Fall of the Islamic State.” 2016. Wilson Center. July 5, 2016. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state.

The fine line between informants and instigators: a look into entrapment in terrorism cases

This continues our series of student reflections and analysis authored by our research team.

Getting involved in the Prosecution Project has been an incredible learning experience in research, data analysis, critical problem solving and decision making skills. During my research, I’ve become more and more fascinated in the cases where accused terrorists believed themselves to be part of a movement, or even worse, were forcibly taken from their daily lives and imprisoned, at the urging and manipulation of law enforcement officers. The federal government has been involved in elaborate schemes designed to “catch” would-be terrorists or spotlighting activities that would appear harmless if done by what America would consider to be an “average American citizen”. I’m intrigued by the how the Federal Bureau of Investigation chooses to use informants, how often entrapment really occurs in terrorism cases, and what the implications are going forward.

According to Wadie E. Said’s article, The Terrorist Informant, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is bound by certain conditions and practices regarding informants before the authorization of undercover investigations is possible. One of the main factors that must be considered is whether the target has any predisposition to commit a crime. Federal agents have the task of deciding the likelihood of criminal behavior to occur, a task that should be approached as objectively as possible. Unfortunately, human nature favors prejudice by instilling us with personal biases. The stigma surrounding Arabs and Muslims since September 2001 has resulted in increased FBI prevention efforts and controversial tactics intended to catch terrorists before attacks occur. Specifically, Said mentions the placing of undercover agents and surveillance of mosques. This tactic seems wildly outlandish given the seriousness with which we take our first amendment rights of free expression and religion. Yet the practice still occurs, creating room for the implication that the federal government believes there to be a strong connection between the islamic faith and international terrorism. The entrapment doctrine is in place to lead federal agents away from seeing terroristic activity or intent where there is none. The point of the doctrine is to focus on the conduct of law enforcement rather than only the acts of the suspect. According to Said, an entrapment defense has never been successful in exonerating a terrorism suspect in the U.S. Supreme Court.

Since September 2001, informants have played a fairly significant role in terrorism prosecutions. Many of the cases in tPP’s dataset involve the use of informants in gathering intelligence and providing incriminating evidence of suspects. My main concern is how many of these accused terrorists were either coerced into participation or had motives and intentions forced upon them. This, of course, may be an impossible task since there is no reasonable way of knowing the absolute truth. However, scholars Jesse J. Norris and Hanna Grol-Prokopczyk published a journal article in 2016 titled Estimating the Prevalence of Entrapment in Post-9/11 Terrorism Cases that provides extensive research and data analysis on the subject. In their studies on specific cases, they admit that the involvement of informants obviously muddies up the scope of involvement and the seriousness of potential terror plots. From their conclusions, it appears that a majority amount of defendants they analyzed were unlikely to have been involved in true terrorism in the legal definition. Given the volume of terrorism prosecutions since 9/11, the implications of this result could be serious for numerous imprisoned individuals. Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk acknowledge the limitations of their study in that it’s impossible to say who would or would not have eventually committed crimes without the push of an informant. That may be the most concerning part, if we are unable to discern the truth from the all the mud, how can we prevent entrapment?

– Katie Reilly


NORRIS, J. J., & GROL-PROKOPCZYK, H. (2016). Estimating the Prevalence of Entrapment in Post-9/11 Terrorism Cases. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 105(3), 609–677.

Said, W. E. (2010). The Terrorist Informant. Washington Law Review, 85(4), 687–738.